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NOTE
AL-AULAQI V. OBAMA: MUST ELIMINATING

DANGEROUS TERRORISTS ENTAIL ACCEPTING
DANGEROUS POLITICAL DOCTRINES?
Benjamin S. White'
I. INTRODUCTION

"How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is, to have a thankless child!"'
Without a doubt, these words from King Lear ring in the ears of a father
who, in spite of tremendous and thankless efforts, has lost his son. This
Note addresses the story of a father and a son who found themselves, like
King Lear and his children, on opposing sides of the ideological spectrum.
The father is Nasser Al-Aulaqi-law abiding American citizen, Fulbright
Scholar, and academic.2 The son is Anwar Al-Aulaqi-Muslim Imam,
international terrorist, and senior member of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP). Even these very brief descriptions may give some
indication of the ideological differences separating the father from his son.
Perhaps, if no other characters had been introduced into this King Lear-like
"play," the divide between father and son might not have become so
apparent, or so public. The United States Government, another actor on the
stage, significantly complicates this family dynamic. A father who might
have been content to simply leave his son alone was forced to become his
advocate before the U.S. Government. The father's fight to save the life of
his son began in 2010, after the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of

t Student Development Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 8. J.D.
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2014); B.S., Social Sciences, Thomas Edison
State College (2010).
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, King Lear act 1, sc. 4. In King Lear, the King's children
engage in constant deceits and trickery toward their father and each other. The children plot
alternatively to kill their father and each other as they become increasingly jealous. In the
end, the evil plans of the children are thwarted, and all who engaged in them meet with
untimely ends. The strain is more than the King can bear, and he leaves the throne to his one
faithful son.
2. Anwar al-Awlaki, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(Aug. 31,
2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0831/Anwar-al-Awlaki-ACLU-wants-militantcleric-taken-off-US-kill-list.
3. WASHINGTON PosT (Dec. 25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/24/AR2009122400536.htn.
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Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 4 labeled Anwar Al-Aulaqi a "Specially
Designated Global Terrorist" (SDGT).s
Al-Aulaqi was born in New Mexico in 1971.6 He spent most of his early
years in the United States; he attended college at Colorado State University
and eventually received a master's degree from San Diego State University.
After college, he became an Imam' at Rabat Mosque in San Diego,
California, and later at Dar al Hijra Mosque in Falls Church, Virginia.
Anwar was investigated by the FBI in 1999 and 2000, when the Bureau
became aware that he had contacted Omar Abdel Rahman, known as "the
blind sheik."o The investigation was later dropped due to insufficient
evidence." After September 11, however, the government re-opened its
investigation because it discovered that Anwar had close connections with
terrorists. 2 Federal investigators questioned Anwar regarding the attacks of
3
September 11, 2001, and issued a felony arrest warrant. He narrowly
avoided arrest in 2002, and was permitted to leave the United States when
4. United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-ForeignAssets-Control.aspx.
5. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (2010). This designation was made on
July 16, 2010. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8. An "Imam" holds a position of leadership in the Islamic community, usually as the
worship leader of a mosque, but often fulfills a position of political leadership as well. In the
United States, an Imam often functions as a representative of the local Muslim community.
9. 911 Commission Report, Appendix A, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/
report/91 1Report_App.pdf (last visited March 3, 2013).
10. How Anwar Awlaki Got Away, ABC NEws (Nov. 30, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/
Omar
Blotter/FtHoodInvestigation/anwar-awlaki/story?id=9200720&page=1#.UIw7zcXoQk4.
Abdel Raman is an Egyptian Cleric who was convicted for crimes related to the bombing of the
World Trade Center in 1993. Sheik Sentenced to Life in Prison in Bombing Plot, NEW YORK
TIMES (Jan. 18, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/18/nyregion/sheik-sentenced-to-lifein-prison-in-bombing-plot.html. Rahman was a charismatic leader who frequently denounced
his home country, the United States, and Israel, for their opposition to the religion of Islam. Id.
He was convicted on various conspiracy charges, and was sentenced to life in prison on January
17, 1996. Id.
11. How Anwar Alwaki Got Away, supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE: ANWAR AL-AWLAKI PROFILE (updated Nov. 2011),
http://www.adl.org/mainTerrorism/anwar-al-awlaki.htm; How Anwar Awlaki Got Away,
supra note 10. This warrant was issued not for terrorist activity, but for passport fraud
committed by Anwar in the early 1990s when he applied for an F-I federal student visa. Id.
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authorities abruptly rescinded his arrest warrant." The facts surrounding
the rescinding of his arrest warrant have not been explained." The action
both astonished and infuriated agents who had worked long and hard to
obtain the warrant for Anwar's arrest. 6 After leaving the country, Anwar
eventually settled in Yemen."
Beginning in 2009, Anwar began taking on an operational role in
AQAP-Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula." This operational role
included facilitating the operations of terrorist training camps in Yemen
and participating in the training of several high profile terrorists. 9 There is
evidence that Anwar instructed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to
detonate a bomb on a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day 2009.20
Other evidence connects Anwar with another domestic terrorist, Nidal
Malik Hasan, who carried out a mass shooting in November 2009 at Fort
Hood Texas.21 The evidence indicates that Anwar and Hasan may have
exchanged as many as eighteen emails prior to the shooting.22 Anwar made
numerous public statements praising the actions of Abdulmutallab and
Hasan, in which he referred to the two men as "his students" and
encouraged others to take similar actions." Anwar remained consistently
belligerent about his betrayal of his country. In an interview broadcast in
May 2010 by AQAP, he insisted that he "will never surrender," even stating,
"I have no intention of turning myself in to [the Americans]. If they want
me, let them search for me. "24
14. Id. The FBI and customs officials detained Anwar when he landed on a flight from
Saudi Arabia to New York. Id. After a few hours, officials confirmed that the arrest warrant
had been revoked, and Anwar was released. Id.
15. How Anwar Awlaki Got Away, supra note 10. The U.S. Attorney's Office in Denver,
which was responsible for rescinding the warrant declined to comment on why this action
was taken. Id.
16. Id.
17. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (2010).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Nidal Malik Hasan, NEW YoRK TIMEs (Sept. 7, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/people/h/nidalmalik_hasan/index.html.
Hasan, an Army
psychiatrist, killed thirteen people and wounded 32 in the shooting at Fort Hood, Texas on
November 5, 2009. Id.
22. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 11.
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Anti-terrorism officials became increasingly concerned that Anwar
might influence English-speaking audiences.25 Anwar's familiarity with the
psyche and attitudes of people in the West was a key concern for the
administration.2 6 In spite of the evidence against him, the United States did
not, either before or after the decision handed down in Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama,27 publicly charge Anwar with any crime.28 At the time of the Aulaqi
decision, the Government would neither confirm nor deny whether it had
placed Anwar on a "kill list."29 Anwar had made clear, however, that he had
no intention of making himself available for criminal prosecution in the
United States.30
On July 16, 2010, Anwar was labeled an SDGT' on the grounds that he
was "acting for or on the behalf of... AQAP," and that he was "providing
financial, material or technological support for, or other services to or in
support of, acts of terrorism. "32 Now enters Nasser Al-Aulaqi,
father/advocate extraordinaire. Nasser's work to save his son began in
earnest after the SDGT designation.33 According to Nasser, in addition to
this designation, the government placed his son on a "kill list" maintained
4
by the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).1 He claimed
that placement on the executive kill list took place after a 'closed executive
35
process"' determined that "'secret criteria"' had been satisfied. This
36
methodology, alleged Nasser, violated the Due Process Clause.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1. AI-Aulaqi was a civil case, not a criminal case. Id. The case was brought by
Anwar's father Nasser Al-Aulaqi in an attempt to prevent the government from targeting his
son for assassination without due process. Id.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 11. The "kill list," according to Nasser, gave the executive branch the power to
unilaterally target Anwar for assassination. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id. (quoting Designation of Anwar Al-Alaqui Pursuant to Executive Order 13224
and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233 (July
16,2010)).
33. Id. at 11. This gave Nasser at least some grounds for his claim that Anwar was a
target of the CIA and JSOC.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 12. The Due Process Clause states: "[Njor [shall any person] be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. .. ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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Nasser Al-Aulaqi sued President Barack Obama, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Leon
Panetta." The suit was on his behalf and on behalf of his son Anwar.18
Nasser's purpose in bringing the suit was simple-to prevent the United
States government from killing his son. 9 Nasser sought to enjoin all of the
defendants from targeting Anwar for assassination "'unless [Anwar]
presents a concrete, specific, and imminent threat . .. and there are no

means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to
neutralize the threat."' 40 In his father's opinion, Anwar apparently did not
present such a threat.
On December 7, 2010, the United States District Court in the District of
Columbia rejected Nasser's requests in Ai-Aulaqi v. Obama. The court
granted the Government's motion to dismiss the case42 and held that the
political question doctrine made the issue of executive kill-lists nonjusticiable." Nasser lost his legal battle for his son's life and chose not to
appeal his case." Nasser's greatest loss, however, came several months later.
On September 30, 2011, two unmanned Predator drones flew over the
Yemen countryside, as a convoy traveled below." Seconds later, Hellfire
missiles launched by the drones screamed toward the vehicles in the
convoy.4 6 Anwar and three others died in the attack." The Government's
37. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 1.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id. (quoting Compl., Prayer for Relief (a)).
41. Id. at 54.
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 43. This appeal to the political question doctrine is the main focus of this Note.
The political question doctrine was improperly applied to allow the executive unprecedented
latitude in decision-making. Consider: judicial approval is required in order to subject a U.S.
citizen living overseas to electronic surveillance. Id. at 8. No judicial approval is required,
however, when the executive determines that a U.S. citizen living overseas should be
assassinated. Id. The discrepancy between these standards is clearly evident, and this Note
will demonstrate that it is the result of improper application of the political question
doctrine.
44. Subsequent to Anwar's death, Nasser filed another lawsuit, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta,
challenging the targeted killing itself. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta: Lawsuit Challenging Targeted
Killings, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/al-aulaqi-v-panetta (last visited Oct.
26, 2013).
45. Two U.S.-Born TerroristsKilled in CM-Led DroneStrike, Fox NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/30/us-born-terror-boss-anwar-al-awlaki-killed/.
46. Id.
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quest to eliminate a dangerous terrorist was successfully completed, and a
father's quest to save his son had ended, but hardly successfully. Like King
Lear's quest to leave an inheritance for his children, Nasser Al-Aulaqi's
quest was crushed.
The U.S. Government hailed the killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi as a
significant "milestone" in the effort to defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates
around the world."8 Anwar had become an increasingly vital part of AQAP,
and, without a doubt, his death was a blow to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations due to his unique understanding of Western and American
culture." Before examining the application of the political question
doctrine, this Note will briefly describe the court's decision in Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama
Nasser Al-Aulaqi brought his suit against the Obama administration
because, according to Nasser, Anwar was "'hiding under threat of death and
[could not] access counsel or the courts to assert his constitutional rights
without disclosing his whereabouts and exposing himself to possible attack
by [the United States]."'

This was in spite of the fact that Anwar did not

try to vindicate his own constitutional rights-nor did he intend to do so."
Nasser alleged that the United States government's policy of authorizing the
killing of U.S. citizens outside of armed conflict violated Anwar's
constitutional rights.52 Nasser's claim argued against the use of force "'in
circumstances in which [those targeted] do not present concrete, specific,
and imminent threats to life or physical safety, and where there are means
other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize any
such threat."'

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (quoting Conpi. 5 6).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id. (quoting Compl. 55 27-28).
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1. Procedural Issues
Nasser sought declarative and injunctive relief." He requested
declarations that (1) the targeted killing of U.S. citizens outside of armed
conflict, or within the exception of a "concrete, specific, and imminent
threat," is a violation of the Constitution; and that (2) outside of armed
conflict, "treaty and customary international law prohibit the targeted
killing of all individuals-regardless of citizenship-except in those same,
limited circumstances. Nasser also requested injunctions (1) prohibiting
the U.S. Government from intentionally killing Anwar, unless he presented
a concrete, specific, and imminent threat, and there existed no other
reasonable means of neutralizing the threat,5 and (2) requiring the
administration to disclose the criteria used to determine whether an
American citizen will be targeted for assassination."
According to Nasser, the requested relief was necessary because the
administration's policies violated Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable seizures," Fifth Amendment Due Process protections,60 and
the Alien Tort Statute.6 ' Nasser also alleged that the government's refusal to
disclose the criteria by which it selects citizens for targeted killing is a
violation of the notice requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 62
2.

The Ruling

The court dismissed Nasser's case63 after hearing nearly three hours of
oral argument from counsel.' The court held that Nasser lacked standing to
bring suit65 and failed to state a claim under the Alien Tort Statute' and also

54. Id. at 12.
55. Id. (quoting Compl. 55 21, 23).
56. Id. at 12 (quoting Compl. 6).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects shall
not be violated . . .." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 54.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Id. at 35.
66. Id. at 35.
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held that the issue was non-justiciable under the political question
doctrine."
a.

Standing

Nasser claimed that he had standing both as a third party and as Anwar's
"next friend."" The court spent a large portion of the sixty-four pages of the
decision analyzing and rejecting both of Nasser's theories of standing.6 9 Two
prerequisites must be met in order to qualify for standing as a "next
friend."" First, the person seeking this status must provide an adequate
explanation why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own
behalf." Second, the next friend must be truly dedicated to the best interests
of the real party in interest.7 2 There were several reasons why Nasser did not
satisfy these requirements. The "inability to appear" prerequisite was not
met because the court held that Anwar's unwillingness to appear before the
court was not the same as an inability to do so." The court observed that
there was nothing preventing Anwar from presenting himself at the U.S.
Embassy in Yemen, whereupon he would be accorded his constitutional
rights." The "best interests" prerequisite was not met due to Nasser's
questionable ability to represent Anwar's "best interests," seeing that Anwar
evidently had no desire to vindicate his constitutional rights." The court
held that Nasser could not be allowed to speculate about what was in
Anwar's best interests. 6
Nasser also failed to meet the requirements for third party standing.7 To
satisfy these requirements, the litigant must meet three criteria: (1) the
litigant must show that he himselfhas suffered a concrete injury sufficient to
satisfy the "case-or-controversy" requirement; (2) that he is a close relation
to the third party; and (3) that the third party's ability to protect his own

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14-35.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 at 163 (1990)).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 24.
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interests is somehow hindered." The court held that Nasser could not show
that a parent "suffers an injury in fact when his adult son is threatened with
a future extra-judicial killing"" and thus failed to meet the requirements for
third party standing. Nasser's case failed to meet the requirements for either
type of standing."
b. The Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS)" was passed as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789.82 The ATS was intended to provide jurisdiction for a set of actions
recognized at common law as "'torts in violation of the law of nations."'
The court held that Nasser had to show both that the threat of a future
killing of his son was a legally cognizable tort in violation of international
law norms and that the United States had waived immunity for that type of
claim.84 In the opinion of the court neither element was satisfied." The
court held that the potential for a future extra-judicial killing was not a
cognizable tort for the purpose of the statute." Nasser also failed to show
that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity for such claims."
c.

The political question doctrine88

"[E]ven if plaintiff has standing to bring his constitutional claims or
states a cognizable claim under the ATS, his claims should still be dismissed
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id. at 25, n.6.
80. Id. at 35.
81. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1948).
82. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
83. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 37.
87. Id. at 35.
88. Though the two previous sections of the opinion encompass a vastly larger portion of
Judge Bates's analysis, it is the use of the political question doctrine on which this Note will
focus. This is not to minimize the importance of the preceding issues. By comparison, however,
the portion of the opinion focused on the political question is of greater relevance than the
previous two. The political question doctrine has never before been used to justify the extrajudicial killing of a U.S. citizen. The closest analogy has been cases where property has been
destroyed by the U.S. government. E.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d
836, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the political question doctrine barred judicial review
of the President's decision to destroy a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant on evidence that it was
linked to terrorism). The use of the doctrine in this manner is reason for pause, to say the least.

420

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:411

because they raise non-justiciable political questions."" This is what the
court concluded regarding the unilateral decision of the executive branch to
target an American citizen for assassination. Traditionally, non-justiciable
political questions are those questions that are excluded from judicial
intervention because of the separation of powers enumerated in the
Constitution.9 0 The political question doctrine evolved to exclude from
judicial review "those controversies which revolve around policy choices
and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the
halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch."" The precise
contours of the doctrine remain "murky and unsettled."" Historically, the
doctrine has been invoked in matters concerning national security, military
matters, and foreign relations. 93 Such cases have been labeled
"quintessential sources of political questions."94 "Matters related to foreign
policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial
intervention."' The D.C. Circuit explained in El-Shifa9 6 that cases involving
foreign policy and national security raise issues that "frequently turn on
standards that defy judicial application.97 In this case, the court held that
"[i]f the political question doctrine means anything in the arena of national
security and foreign relations, it means the courts cannot assess the merits
of the President's decision to launch an attack on a foreign target." 98 The
court claimed that, "just as in El-Shifa, any judicial determination as to the
propriety of a military attack on Anwar Al-Aulaqi'would require this court
to elucidate the standards that are to guide a president when he evaluates
the veracity of military intelligence."' 99 As this Note will discuss, the court's
89. Al-A ulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 44, 52.
90. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
91. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
92. Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
93. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
94. Bacoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
95. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,292 (1981).
96. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
97. Id. at 841 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
98. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (quoting El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 844). The court
glosses over the fact that the target in El-Shifa was a pharmaceutical manufacturing facility,
and not a U.S. citizen. The two are qualitatively different. Pharmaceutical facilities are not
specifically recognized in the Constitution as deserving of due process-United States
citizens are.
99. Id. The court appears to create a straw-man argument, thereby overstating its case.
The court would not be required to elucidate a standard, but simply apply that which already
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analysis represents a break from the traditional view of the doctrine. The
necessities of modern warfare are not such that traditional constitutional
liberties must be suspended. To use the political question doctrine in this
manner is to misunderstand its purpose, as its history demonstrates.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

A. The Origin of the Doctrine
"Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."'0
The political question doctrine, invoked by the Aulaqi court, found its
origin in Marbury v. Madison. Marbury established the principle that
certain questions are by their nature outside the jurisdiction of the courts.
"The province of the court is ... not to enquire how the executive, or
executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.""o' The
"question" at issue in Marbury was, of course, whether the Court could
issue a writ of mandamus to compel the executive to fulfill his duty of
granting a commission. 0 2 For many years after Marbury, the doctrine was
applied in diverse circumstances. In Luther v. Borden,0 o the Court affirmed
the political question doctrine and explained the proper mode of redress for
such questions.'" "If it be asked what redress have the people if wronged in
these matters ... they have the same as in all other political matters . .. the

ballot boxes, [and appeal] to the legislature or executive."'o In Luther, the
Court determined that it was not for the judiciary to determine which of the
two governments that claimed authority over the State of Rhode Island was

appears in the Constitution. "No person shall be ... deprived of life ... without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
101. Id. This quotation, without the ellipses, reads: "The province of the court is, solely, to
decide the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion." Id. (emphasis added). This quotation
prompts a question: If the executive or executive officer's exercise of discretion violates the
rights of an individual, what is the individual's recourse? The decision in Marbury is based
on the idea that there are principles of law that are superior to, and trump all other law.
102. Id. at 138.
103. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
104. Id. at 42 (holding that enforcement of the Guarantee Clause is left to Congress and
the Executive).
105. Id. at 55 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
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the legitimate one."o6 The Court noted that because the Constitution placed
the power to recognize the validity of a state government in Congress, such
a decision by the Court would be "entirely inconsistent" with its
constitutional and statutory grant of power.10 7 The President of the United
States exercised his congressionally vested power by recognizing the charter
government as the valid one.' In light of these facts, the Court held that
the issues involved could not be settled in a judicial proceeding."' The
Court further expanded on the doctrine in Coleman v. Miller,"o which
noted that dominant considerations in determining whether the doctrine
applies include "the appropriateness under our system of government of
attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the
lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination ... .""'Even cases
like Coleman, however, failed to lay out a clear standard or some clear list of
factors for judicial consideration.
B. Baker v. Carr and the Enunciation of the Doctrine
The political question doctrine remained somewhat amorphous until
1961 when the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr."' In Baker, Tennessee
residents brought a civil action for a declaration that a state apportionment
106. Id. at 42. The Luther case arose when Luther's house was broken into and searched
by agents of one of the two purported governments of the State of Rhode Island. Id. at 1.
After the Revolution, the State's charter government remained in place, and no new
constitution was adopted. Id. The charter government retained control unchallenged until
1843, when a new constitution was framed and adopted (ostensibly by a majority of Rhode
Island citizens). Id. The charter government declared martial law, and Luther's home was
invaded by officers of the charter government because he was labeled an "insurrectionist" as
a supporter of the new government. Id. The Court declined to decide not only the question
of which government was the valid one, but also the question of whether the majority vote
claimed by the new government was valid. Id. at 2.
107. Id. Like Marbury, Luther appeals to "general principles of law" in order to explain
precisely why the Court did not have jurisdiction. "[Tlhe American people adopted
principles more especially adapted to their condition. They can be traced through the
Confederation and the present Constitution .. .. " Id. at 30 (Webster, J., concurring). The
judiciary was excluded from judgment on Rhode Island's government based on principles of
government that are extra-Constitutional, such as the principle that the people are the
ultimate source of political power.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
111. Id. at 454.
112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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statute was an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection of the laws,
for an injunction, and for other relief.' 13 The plaintiffs argued that the
statute debased the value of their votes."' The District Court dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and lack of standing."' The Supreme Court
disagreed on all counts."'6 The Court reversed the ruling and remanded the
decision back to the District Court, after giving the first ever in-depth
analysis of the political question doctrine."' Even the Court acknowledged
early in its opinion that "the attributes of the doctrine . .. in various

settings, diverge, combine, appear, and disappear in seeming
disorderliness.""' The Court noted that its precedent neither singly nor
collectively supported a conclusion that this particular case was nonjusticiable."' The Court made clear, however, that it did not hold the
question justiciable on the basis of the Guarantee Clause.'2 0 Rather, the
Court found that the claim was justiciable because the plaintiffs had alleged
a denial of equal protection and were entitled to a decision on these
grounds.' 2'
The Baker Court introduced a clear formulation of the factors that
determine what constitutes a political question. Each political question has
one or more of these factors that identify it as "essentially a function of the

113. Id. at 194-95.
114. Id. at 188.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 197-98.
117. Id. at 188.
118. Id. at 210.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 223. Since Luther, the Court has refused to resort to the Guarantee Clause as a
source of standards for invalidating state action. Id. This is in spite of the fact that until
Baker, the Guarantee Clause was the only clause of the Constitution that had been invoked
for this purpose. Id. The Court cites a plethora of cases brought on Guarantee Clause
grounds and held non-justiciable. See Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 580 (1900) (holding
that Kentucky's resolution of its contested gubernatorial race was non-justiciable, in spite of
the guarantee clause challenge); Pac. States Tel. & T. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 , 151
(holding nonjusticiable the claim that a ballot initiative and referendum had negated
republican government). The Court also notes that the Guarantee Clause cannot be used to
nullify Congressional action that is inconsistent with the Clause. Baker, 369 U.S. at 224. In
summary, the Court in Baker outright rejected the use of the Guarantee Clause to overcome
the political question doctrine.
121. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
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separation of powers."'22 At least one of the following is prominent on the
surface of any case involving a political question: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving [the question]; (3) the impossibility of deciding [the
question] without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing a lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.123 "Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from
the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the
ground of a political question's presence."l 24 The Court made clear that this
doctrine was one of "political questions," not "political cases."1 25 "The
Courts cannot reject ... a bona-fide controversy as to whether some action
denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority." 26 It is important
to note the "necessity for discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and
posture of the particular case, and the impossibility of resolution by any
semantic cataloguing."12' The formulation of the political question doctrine
found in Baker v. Carrhas remained substantially intact. Since Baker, nearly
every decision involving a political question has referenced and applied the
six factors. 2

122. Id. at 217.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005); People's Mojahadin Org. of Iran v.
U.S. Dept. of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999); DKT Mem'1 Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for
Internal Dev., 810 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd
Cir. 1971). The first two factors are the most commonly applied, and analysis often goes no
further. The first two bear the greatest relevance to the most frequent subject of political
question doctrine cases, namely matters of national security and foreign policy.
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C. Modern Applications of the Doctrine
Since the decision in Baker v. Carr, the political question doctrine has
been applied to a variety of subjects related primarily to national security
and foreign relations. In Orlando v. Laird,'2 9 the Second Circuit applied the
doctrine to a claim challenging the constitutionality of the Vietnam War. 30
In Orlando, two enlistees in the United States Army, Berk and Orlando,
filed actions against the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army,
and the commanding officers who signed their deployment orders."' Berk
and Orlando sought an injunction preventing the enforcement of those
orders."' These soldiers contended that these executive officers had
exceeded their constitutional authority by deploying them to fight in a war
that had not been properly authorized by Congress.'33 The soldiers
requested, in the alternative, that the court rule that, because the President
requested that Congress accelerate appropriations and conscriptions after
military action was underway, the decision made by Congress was not made
freely but was compelled by necessity."' The court noted that the wardeclaring power constitutionally delegated to Congress does indeed express
a discoverable and manageable standard for the judiciary to apply regarding
a declaration of war.'35 Thus, consideration of the constitutionality of the
war was not entirely foreclosed by the political question doctrine. The court
held, however, that judicial scrutiny only properly extended to imposing on
Congress the duty of mutual participation in the prosecution of war.'
There was an abundance of evidence, the court held, that the war was being
prosecuted with mutual participation of Congress and the Executive."'
129. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039.
130. Id. at 1043.
131. Id. at 1040.
132. Id.
133. Id. The Vietnam War was never authorized by a Congressional declaration of war.
After the Gulf of Tonkin incident (when a North Vietnamese ship purportedly fired on a
United States Navy vessel, the U.S.S. Maddox), Congress passed the "Joint Resolution to
Promote the Maintenance of Internal Peace and Security in Southeast Asia," commonly
known as the "Tonkin Gulf Resolution." Id. at 1041. The government acted on the belief that
this congressional authorization was sufficient to justify military action in Southeast Asia. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1042. The need for a "judicially discoverable and manageable standard" is the
second criteria from Baker, and the lack of such a standard is perhaps the most frequent
cause for invocation of the doctrine.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Nevertheless, the court went on to explain that the choice between an
explicit declaration of war and war-implementing legislation as a medium
of expressing congressional consent was indeed a political question
demonstrably committed to the legislature.' 8 The court held that it could
use its power to ensure that the basic requirements of the Constitution were
followed, but it could not second-guess the manner in which Congress and
the Executive chose to manage the interplay between the branches.'
Two years later, the Second Circuit was faced with a similar case,
DaCosta v. Laird,'40 in which the plaintiff challenged a specific executive
action ordering the mining of North Vietnam ports and harbors and the
continuation of airstrikes in that country."' Unlike Orlando, DaCosta
acknowledged that the war itself was authorized by Congress but argued
that the President's "unilateral escalation" of the war was not justified
without additional authorization.'42 The court dismissed this argument,
reasoning that Congress, by not cutting off appropriations for the war, had
14
taken a position that was outside of the judiciary's power to alter. ' The
court appealed to the lack of judicially "discoverable and manageable
standards" to justify its decision, noting that "[j]udges, deficient in military
knowledge, lacking vital information upon which to assess the nature of
battlefield decisions ... cannot reasonably or appropriately determine
whether a specific military operation constitutes an 'escalation' of the war or
is merely a new tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan."'44
These two cases are excellent expressions of the political question doctrine.
From these cases, it is evident that the doctrine does not abrogate judicial
duty to uphold the Constitution. In other words, no branch of government
can use the doctrine as a shield against judicial examination of

unconstitutional acts.145

The principle that the political question doctrine does not inhibit the
judiciary's role of upholding the Constitution was further illuminated in

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1043.
Id.
DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2nd Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1154 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1155.
It is the author's contention that this is what the court has allowed the executive to

do in Al-Aulaqi.
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DKT Memorial Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Internal Development.'46 In DKT
Memorial Fund, two non-government organizations ("NGOs") challenged
the legality of a U.S. government policy that prohibited the United States
from contributing funds to foreign NGOs that perform or promote
abortions in other nations.14 The NGOs sought a declaratory judgment that
the policy was a violation of, among other things, their rights under the
First and Fifth Amendments.' The court held that a challenge to the
government's foreign policy decision in this context did not present a
political question and was therefore justiciable.' "Appellants do not seek to
litigate the political and social wisdom of [the government's] foreign policy.
They challenge the legality of [the implementation] of the Policy."'s The
court further noted that: "[W]hereas attacks on foreign policymaking are
nonjusticiable, claims alleging non-compliance with the law are justiciable,
even though the limited review that the court undertakes may have an effect
on foreign affairs."' This is a principle that this Note will examine laterprecedent demonstrates that the political question doctrine was never
intended to obstruct the efforts of individuals to vindicate their
constitutional rights.
Two more recent applications of the doctrine will demonstrate a
developing trend in its use as a means of providing greater executive
latitude in prosecuting the war on terror. In People's Mojahadin
Organization of Iran v. U.S. Department of State,'52 the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals dealt with two organizations that sued the Department of State
to protest their classification as terrorist organizations.' Congress had
granted the Secretary of State the authority to make such designations.'54
146. DKT Mem'l. Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Internal Dev., 810 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
147. Id. at 1237.
148. Id. at 1237-38.
149. Id. at 1238.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. (citing Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1068-70 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
152. People's Mojahadin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dept. of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
153. Id. at 18-19.
154. This authority was granted by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189, the "Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act." This legislation gave the Secretary of State the authority to make
findings (on whatever evidence was available) that a foreign organization was engaged in
terrorist activities and was a threat to the national security of the United States. People's
Mojahadin, 182 F.3d at 19 (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i)(2004)). Ironically, given the
court's decision, the statute specifically provided not only for congressional review of the
Secretary's designations, but judicial review as well. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. §
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The court remarked that the statute involved was unique, both procedurally
and substantively, in that it allowed for no adversarial hearing and no
presentation of what courts and agencies ordinarily refer to as "evidence.""'
In spite of the unique statutory provisions and unconventional
administrative processes, the court concluded that the question of whether a
particular organization threatens the security of the United States is nonjusticiable.1 6 The court reasoned that the Secretary's decision was based on
the quality of the information she received, and the court had no way of
making a determination about such information.' Even more recently, the
5
doctrine was applied specifically to covert operations in other nations." ' in
Schneider v. Kissinger, decided in 2005, the D.C. Circuit ruled on the claims
of Rene and Raul Schneider, sons of the deceased Chilean General Rene
Schneider."' General Schneider was killed in a coup in 1970, a coup
allegedly carried out with the direct support of the CIA." In its application
of the Baker factors, the court found that it could not undertake to analyze
the government's use of covert operations without "defin[ing] a standard
for the government's use of covert operations in conjunction with political
turmoil in another country."' 6' The court further noted that "[t]here are no
[judicially] discoverable and manageable standards for the resolution of
such a claim." 62
In analyzing these cases, two principles warrant attention. First, when
observing the use of the doctrine, it is easy to see what the Supreme Court
recognized in Davis v. Bandemer'61 when it noted the danger of
"transform[ing] the narrow categories of 'political questions' that Baker v.
Carr carefully defined into an ad hoc litmus test of [a court's] reactions to
1189(b)(2)(2004)). The evidence on which the determination was to be made could consist
of information from any source, compiled in an "administrative record." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 23.
157. Id. at 25. The method for the classification in this case is nearly identical to that
analyzed in Al-Aulaqi. One major difference is the effect that the classification could have on
its subject. In People's Mojahadin, the result of the classification was the freezing of assets,
the punishment of those who offer support to the group, and other similar penalties. Id. In
Al-Aulaqi, the result was assassination.
158. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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the desirability of and need for judicial application of constitutional or
statutory standards to a given type of claim."'" There can be little doubt
that there are properly justiciable issues that are not simple or convenient
for the judiciary to manage. In situations like those we have analyzed, the
decisions made by the court have the potential to conflict with decisions of
another branch of government. As Baker noted, one of the factors that the
courts must take into account is the "impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government."16 ' Here we see a dilemma: the courts
cannot use the doctrine as a cover for neglecting their function of
upholding the Constitution, nor can the executive branch use the doctrine
as a "get out of court free" card, thereby avoiding a proper level of judicial
scrutiny. The political question doctrine should be used by the judiciary to
police its own jurisdiction but cannot be used as an excuse to simply stand
by when the executive and legislative branches violate procedural
safeguards guaranteed in the Constitution.166 If the role of the judiciary, like
each of the other branches of government, is to uphold the Constitution,
what result when one branch of government is not upholding the
Constitution, or is at the very least in a constitutional "grey area?"
Second, though the doctrine rightfully holds a respected place in
American Constitutional law, it has never been used to justify judicial nonintervention in a constitutional issue like the one at stake in Al-Aulaqi-an
American citizen's right to due process before he is deprived of life, liberty,
or property.6 Protecting the right at question in Al-Aulaqi, the right to be
charged, tried, and convicted before execution, is perhaps the foremost role
of the judiciary. Has the judiciary abandoned this function, or is it simply
adapting to the necessities of the modern technological warfare? Regardless
of the necessities of modern warfare, there are some constitutional
protections that cannot be allowed to fall by the wayside. Alexander
Hamilton observed, "Safety from external danger is the most powerful
director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a
time, give way to its dictates. . . . To be more safe[, the people], at length,

164. Id. at 126.
165. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
166. "[DIeference rests on reason, not habit.... (A) Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes
to an obvious mistake." Baker, 369 U.S. at 213-14 (quoting Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264
U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924)).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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become willing to run the risk of being less free."' 8 Justice Scalia,
commenting on this passage, remarked, "The Founders warned us about
69
the risk, and equipped us with a Constitution designed to deal with it."
IV. THE WAR ON TERROR

The war on terror has created novel military and intelligence dilemmas.
These dilemmas have resulted in a war that is being fought in an
increasingly large constitutional grey area.'70 There are several reasons for
this, most obvious being the unique nature of the enemies the United States
faces in this war on terror. Terrorists, who are increasingly difficult to
identify and locate, have an increasingly potent ability to cause death and
devastation to thousands, perhaps millions, of people. Advances in weapons
and communications technology have made each individual terrorist a
potentially vital part of the terror network."' Even a single highly skilled
computer programmer has the potential ability to wreak havoc on entire
governments.'7 2 Conventional methods of warfare, based in a time when
each individual soldier was more or less a dispensable part of an overall
structure, are ineffective at combating this threat. The government has
taken this into account and has adapted to meet the changing threat. The
approach to warfare adopted by the United States has become increasingly
unconventional, particularized, and tailored to the amorphous nature of the
enemy."' Concomitant to this approach has been an unprecedented and

168. THE FEDERALIST No. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
169. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Scalia, J.dissenting).
170. These conundrums have resulted in a vast increase of Federal power, such as
presidential war-making powers, domestic surveillance, and detention and interrogation of
suspects.
171. Criminalsand Terroristsin a Borderless, TechnologicalArms Race, FORBES MAGAZINE
http://www.forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/07/14/criminals-and2012),
14,
(July
terrorists-in-a-borderless-technological-arms-race/.
172. F.B.I. Director Warns Congress About Terrorist Hacking, THE NEW YORK TIMES
7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/us/fbi-director-warns-about(March
terrorist-hacking.html.
173. There is a certain irony in the fact that it is precisely the indiscriminatenature of the
manner in which terrorists make war that makes highly discriminate,particularizedresponse
a necessity. One individual or group can target thousands, demanding a government
response against individuals who are often acting outside of any established government. In
order to avoid collateral damage, the government response is often specifically targeted at an
individual or small group.

2014]1

AL-AULAQI V. OBAMA

431

unfortunate potential for public acceptance of improper restrictions on
freedom."
The Supreme Court has noted that rules of constitutional law should be
adopted only with great caution when they could "inhibit the flexibility of
the political branches of government to respond to changing world
conditions.""' The Court has also recognized that "an area concerning
foreign affairs that has been uniformly found appropriate for judicial review
is the protection of individual or constitutional rights from government
action."'76 "This protection of the individual unquestionably extends to
cases involving the United States Government action taken against our own
citizens abroad.""' Here we see the crux of the issue presented in Al-Aulaqi
v. Obama: to what extent can or should necessity or the need for
"flexibility" be allowed to dictate policy? Perhaps more fundamentally,
should circumstances dictate how we view and interpret the Constitution?
This question must control our analysis of the political question doctrine.
The next subsections will examine the doctrine in light of these questions as
it has been applied during the war on terror.
A. Indefinite Detention"'
"[T]he political question doctrine does not preclude judicial review of
prolonged Executive detention predicated on an enemy combatant
determination because the Constitution specifically contemplates a judicial

174. Public acceptance of restrictions on freedom begins slowly, as we limit the freedoms
of others, in this case terrorists. Without a clear constitutional basis for limiting the freedom
of anyone, necessity will cause us, as Alexander Hamilton noted, to allow restrictions for the
sake ensuring our safety. The erosion of freedom often begins by limiting the rights of those
perceived as a threat. After the people begin to tolerate infringements on the rights of those
who are considered a threat, all that is required for further erosion is the redefinition of who
constitutes a "threat."
175. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
176. Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1191 (1984) (citing Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81-82, 96).
177. Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957)).
178. Indefinite detention has been analyzed primarily under the Suspension Clause (U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2) not under the political question doctrine. Courts properly view the
issue of detention as being specifically committed to the judicial branch. See Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004). Political question receives little explicit discussion in these cases.
Implicitly, however, there is significant overlap between political question analysis, and the
determination of whether the judicial branch can overrule both Executive and Legislative
claims of autonomy on this issue.
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role in this area.""' "The [Suspension] Clause protects the rights of the
detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the
jailer to account."'s In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court was
presented with the claim of alien terrorists who were detained at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,'' after being captured abroad and designated
enemy combatants by a "Combatant Status Review Tribunal" ("CSRT").1'8 2
The detainees sought a writ of habeas corpus.183 The question before the
Supreme Court was whether aliens at Guantanamo were entitled to the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, in spite of a congressional
decision to the contrary.' In 2005, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act ("DTA"), which provided procedures for review of a
detainee's status.' Specifically, § 1005(e) of the DTA amended 28 U.S.C. §
2241 to establish that "no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider ... an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.""' The Court held that this provision did not apply to cases (like
that in Boumediene) pending when the DTA was enacted.' Congress
responded by again amending § 2241 to disallow any habeas petitions from
Guantanamo.'" The Court held that this constituted an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ,'" and that art. I, § 9, cl. 2 of the Constitution (the
"Suspension Clause") has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.'90 Congress did
not purport to formally suspend the writ, and the Court held that, without a
179. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745 (2008)).
180. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
181. Because the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay is outside of the sovereign
territory of the United States, lower courts held that they did not have jurisdiction over
claims originating there. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp.2d 55 (2002); Al Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (2003). When Rasul was appealed, the Supreme Court held that U.S.
courts have jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay, reading 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to extend statutory
habeas corpus jurisdiction to Guantanamo. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
182. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723, 732.
183. Id. at 732.
184. Id. at 732-33.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 735 (quoting 119 Stat. 2742).
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 732.
Id. at 771.
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formal suspension, Congress could not deny the privilege of habeas corpus
to detainees.' The Court noted that indefinite imprisonment, even on
reasonable suspicion, was simply not an available option of treatment for
those accused of aiding the enemy.19 2
The Court held that it could not "impose a de facto suspension by
abstaining from [the] controversy," noting that "abstention is not
appropriate in cases. . . in which the legal challenge 'turn[s] on the status of
the persons as to whom the military asserted its power.""9 " After first
determining that the Court could not abstain from involvement in the
controversy (implicitly recognizing the absence of a political question), the
Court examined the government's next argument: that Congress had
provided adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus and, thus, was
in compliance with the Suspension Clause.'94 Even though the Court of
Appeals did not see fit to address this issue in earlier proceedings, the
Supreme Court found the circumstances to be of an "exceptional" nature
sufficient to warrant a departure from its general rule of declining to
address issues left unresolved in the lower courts.' The Court observed the
historical reticence of Congress regarding suspensions of the writ."' Unlike
any previous modifications of the Suspension Clause, the statutes in
question in Boumediene did not attempt to merely streamline habeas review
but attempted to circumscribe it entirely.'7 The Court concluded that it
would not "endeavor to offer a comprehensive summary of the requisites
for an adequate substitute for habeas corpus."' We do consider it
"uncontroversial, however, that habeas privilege entitles the prisoner to a
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to

191. Id.
192. Id. (citing to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 654 (2004)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 771-72.
195. Id. at 772.
196. Id. at 773-74. The Court noted several exceptions to the usual hesitance to suspend
the writ, such as Title I of the Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) § 106, which restricts the ability of prisoners to bring successive habeas corpus
claims. Id. at 774. These provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. (quoting Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662-64 (1996)). The Boumediene Court observed, however, that the
substituted procedures in Felker were not a substantial departure from the common law, but
simply codified the longstanding "abuse-of-the-writ" doctrine. Id.
197. Id. at 776.
198. Id. at 779.
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'the erroneous application or interpretation' of relevant law."" The Court
further noted that "the habeas court must have the power to order the
conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained."200 Common law
habeas corpus "was, above all, an adaptable remedy [the] precise application
and scope [of which] changed depending upon the circumstances. "201
Most relevant to the analysis of extra-judicial assassination, the
Boumediene Court noted that "[w]here a person is detained by executive
order, rather than, say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need
for collateral review is most pressing." 20 2 Because "these dynamics [of a
disinterested judicial hearing or trial] are not inherent in executive
detention orders or executive review procedures," the courts must have
authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention
and the executive's power to detain. 2 03 Boumediene held that, subject to
certain factors, even non-citizen enemy combatants are protected by the
Suspension Clause and have the right of habeas corpus. 2 04
The Court has rightly gone to great lengths to protect the right of habeas
corpus enshrined in the Constitution, overruling the policy decisions of
In Hamdan v.
both Congress and the President in the process.
20 6
Rumsfeld, the Court explained that even though the president had
determined that it was impractical to apply the same standard to military
commissions as to United States courts, simply appealing to the danger of
international terrorism was insufficient to justify a departure from the

199. Id. at 728-29.
200. Id. at 729.
201. Id. at 779.
202. Id. at 783.
203. Id. The Court found that in order to determine the necessary scope of review, it
could assess the CSRT review process and the mechanism through which the designation as
enemy combatants becomes final. Id.
204. Id. at 766. The Court established the relevance of "at least three" factors in
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the
detainee, and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3)
the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ. Id.
205. Id. at 795 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) unconstitutional); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 623-25 (2006) (holding that policies established under the Detainee Treatment Act
of 1996, and specific policy determinations made by the President violated the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
206. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
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ordinary process.207 After examining Boumediene and Hamdan, the
comparison between the rights afforded to a non-citizen enemy combatant
and those of a citizen designated a terrorist is striking. Lakhdar
Boumediene, as a non-citizen terrorist, was entitled to have his case heard
by a disinterested judge or jury in order for the administration to continue
his detention.2 08 Anwar Al-Aulaqi, as an American citizen living in Yemen,
was never charged with a crime but was targeted for assassination and killed
with no judicial recourse.20 9 At the very least, this discrepancy is concerning.
Can it really be that a non-citizen detainee is entitled to greater procedural
safeguards than a United States citizen living overseas who has never been
charged with a crime?
B. Destruction of Property
"Whether the circumstances warrant a military attack on a foreign target
is a 'substantive political judgment. . . entrusted expressly to the coordinate
branches of government."210 "[Tihe political question doctrine does not
permit us to mimic the constitutional role of the political branches by
guessing how they would have conducted the nation's foreign policy had
they been better informed."2 1 ' In El-Shifa, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia was presented with the claim of the
owners of a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant. 21 2 The owners claimed that
their plant had been destroyed unjustifiably, because the plant had no
connection to terrorists.21 3 In a letter to Congress, President Clinton
reported that the strikes "were a necessary and proportionate response to
the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and
facilities" and "were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a

207. Id. at 623.
208. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
209. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 44 (2010).
210. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 837.
213. Id. The missile strike on the pharmaceutical plant was undertaken simultaneously
with a similar attack on a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. Id. at 838. These strikes
were carried out on August 20, 1998 in response to the bombing of United States embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania by Osama bin Laden's network two weeks previous. Id. The factory
in Sudan was believed to be associated with the bin Laden network and involved in the
manufacture of chemical weapons material. Id.
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clearly identified terrorist threat."2 14 According to the plaintiff, the press
quickly debunked the President's claim that the plant was manufacturing
chemical weapons or associated with Osama bin Laden.215 Because of this,
the plaintiffs pursued a lawsuit in order to recover their losses.2 16 The
plaintiffs alleged that the justifications for the attack were "based on false
premises and were offered with reckless disregard of the truth based upon
grossly incomplete research and unreasonable analysis of inconclusive
intelligence."217 Within days, administration officials began retracting or
revising their statements regarding the extent and strength of the evidence
connecting the plant with Osama bin Laden.21 8 The plaintiffs brought suit
after the CIA rejected their requests for compensation.21 9
The Court held that it was not "a forum for reconsidering the wisdom of
discretionary decisions made by the political branches in the realm of
foreign policy or national security."22 0 The court distinguished, however,
between claims that require the court to "decide whether taking military
action was 'wise'-'a policy choice"' and "claims presenting purely legal
issues such as whether the government had legal authority to act."221 The ElShifa court pointed out that a plaintiff cannot "clear the political question
bar simply by 'recasting [such] foreign policy and national security
questions in tort terms."2 22 The plaintiffs comparison of their case to
Boumediene and Hamdi did not convince the court that the issues involved
were similar. Boumediene and Hamdi were justiciable, the court held,
"because the Constitution specifically contemplates a judicial role in th[e]
area [of detainee's rights]."223 The court noted that, "while the presence of
constitutionally protected liberties could require us to address limits on the
foreign policy and national security powers assigned to the political

214. Id. at 838.
215. Id. at 839.
216. Id. The amount claimed by the owners was $50 million as just compensation under
the Takings Clause of the Constitution. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 842.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 842-43 (quoting Schneider, 412 F.3d at 197 (explaining that courts could not
determine whether taking military action was "wrongful" as an element of a wrongful death
claim)).
223. Id. at 848.
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branches," the plaintiffs could "point to no ... constitutional commitment
to the courts for review of a military decision to launch a missile at a foreign
target."2 24 The plaintiffs were unable to recover for the destruction of their
factory.225
Though both the right to property and the right to life are enshrined in
the Fifth Amendment, they are not on an entirely equal plane.226 Indeed,
one is a prerequisite for the other. Blackstone referred to property as the
"third absolute right," behind the right to life and liberty.2 27 If Blackstone is
correct, it follows that the right to life is deserving of a greater level of
protection than that extended to property rights in El-Shifa. The writers of
our Constitution, being well-acquainted with Blackstone, protected the
right to life with greater specificity than the right to property.228 The El-Shiffa
court held that the presence of a constitutionally protected liberty could
require courts to address limits on the foreign policy and national security
powers assigned to the political branches.22 9 Is there no constitutionally
protected liberty applicable to the assassination of a United States citizen
who was never charged with a crime? In Judge Bates's decision in Al-Aulaqi
v. Obarma, he poses the question: "[h]ow is it that judicial approval is
required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for
electronic surveillance, but that ... judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the
United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death?" 230 How,
indeed?
C. The Necessity of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine in the War on Terror
The political question doctrine, as it relates to the war on terror, serves a
vital purpose. The Al-Aulaqi court explained, as have many other courts

224. Id. at 849.
225. Id. at 859.
226. Luigi Marco Bassani, Life, Liberty, and ... : Jefferson on Property Rights, 18.1
JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 31, 58 (2004) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's view that the
right to property was secondary to the right to life), http://mises.org/journals/jls/
18_1/18_I_2.pdf.
227. Id.
228. The right to life (and concomitantly, to liberty) is protected by a plethora of
procedural safeguards in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. By comparison, the right
to property is protected by the broader assurances of Due Process of law, and just
compensation.
229. El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 849.
230. Al-Aulaqiv. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1,8(2010).
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applying the political question doctrine to battlefield situations, that the
judiciary is "institutionally ill-equipped to 'assess the nature of battlefield
decisions."'2 3' In particular regarding the use of covert operations, the
judiciary is ill equipped to define a standard for their use.232 This assessment
is especially relevant to the war on terror, due to the unique nature of the
enemy the United States faces. Terrorists blend in with local populations
and constantly shift their bases of operation, making secrecy a key
component of any efforts to eradicate terrorism.233 The Founders
recognized the need for executive latitude in protecting the nation. This
power "ought to exist without limitation ... [b]ecause it is impossible to
foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the
correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to
satisfy them."2 34 "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the
definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks."2 35 The executive is particularly suited
to prosecute the war on terror because "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch will generally characterise the proceedings of one man, in a much
more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number."236 The
Supreme Court has long recognized and respected this function of the
executive, noting that the president has the authority "to employ [the
Nation's Armed Forces] in the manner he may deem most effectual to
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy."237 The Court has also
recognized that "[siecrecy in respect of information gathered by
[confidential sources] may be highly necessary, and the premature
disclosure of it productive of harmful results,"238 and that it would be
"intolerable that courts ... should review and perhaps nullify actions of the
Executive taken on information properly held secret."2 39 There can be little

231. Id. at 45 (citing DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146,1155 (2nd Cir. 1973)).
232. Id.
233.

See
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NATIONAL

STRATEGY

FOR
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https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-onTERRORISM
(February, 2003)
terrorism/CounterTerrorism Strategy.pdf.
234. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 23,
(Alexander Hamilton)).
235. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, (Alexander Hamilton)).

236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 581.
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850).
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1972).
Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
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doubt that the political question doctrine is particularly applicable to the
war on terror. It is vital that the executive be free from judicial review of the
implementation of the specific strategies and tactics that he believes
necessary to defend the nation against this peculiar threat. Nevertheless, as
the Supreme Court has noted, when the doctrine is invoked as a judicial
"reaction .. . to the desirability of .. . judicial application of constitutional
or statutory standards to a given type of claim," the court has abused the
doctrine.240
D. The UnconstitutionalExpansion of the Scope of the PoliticalQuestion
Doctrine in the War on Terror
The Al-Aulaqi court noted that "this Court does not hold that the
Executive possesses 'unreviewable authority to order the assassination of
any American whom he labels an enemy of the state." 24 ' Somewhat
enigmatically, the court continued: "[rather the court only concludes that it
lacks the capacity to determine whether a specific individual in hiding
overseas ... presents such a threat to national security that the United States
may authorize the use of lethal force against him."242 The Al-Aulaqi court
"readily acknowledges," however, that it is a "drastic measure" for the
United States to employ lethal force against one of its own citizens
abroad.243 It seems that the court made the following mystifying distinction:
though there are instances when the power of the executive to terminate an
American citizen could be reviewed, the "drastic measure" of the use of
lethal force against an American claimed to be a national security threat
hiding overseas is not such an instance. The court has created a meaningless
distinction. When a citizen has been assassinated, the court's assurance that
there are certain instances in which he would have been entitled to due
process before being targeted by his own government is hardly comforting.
Given that neither the Al-Alauqi court nor the executive branch was willing
to illuminate the criteria it used to make the decision to target a citizen, the
hypothetical distinction is meaningless. Additionally, in a case where a
"specific individual in hiding overseas ... presents ... a threat to national
security,"244 there is nothing to motivate the executive branch to work

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126 (1986).
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 52 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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through the traditional channels required to authorize capturing, detaining,
or even monitoring a suspected terrorist when, without any further ado, it
245
can order that individual targeted for assassination.
The Al-Aulaqi court noted that the plaintiff was asking the court to do
exactly what the El-Shifa court prohibited: assess the merits of the
246
President's decision to launch an attack on a foreign target. The court
cavalierly dismissed the fact that the foreign target in this case "happens to
be" a U.S. citizen, holding that this fact was irrelevant in the context of the
El-Shifa rationale. The court similarly dismissed "the mere fact" that the
24 8
target of military action was an individual rather than enemy property.
The court's out-of-hand dismissal of these relevant facts is not consistent
249
with the Supreme Court's analysis of similar scenarios. In Flynn v. Shultz,
the Court noted that "[judicial] protection of the individual unquestionably
extends to cases involving United States Government action taken against
our own citizens abroad" 25 0 and that judicial review for the protection of the
individual has been "uniformly found appropriate."2 1 Not only does the
citizenship status of the targeted individual distinguish him from prior case
law that applies the political question doctrine, it indicates that the situation
requires a different framework of analysis than that applied to detainees,
non-citizen terrorists, or destruction of property.252
The political question doctrine was applied incorrectly in the case of AlAulaqi v. Obama. The traditional Baker criteria to which the court
appealed-the constitutional commitment of the issue to another branch
and the lack of judicially manageable standards-are not applicable to the
issue of extra-judicial assassination of United States citizens. There are two
major reasons why the use of the political question doctrine was improper
in this case. The first major reason is that the court either selectively applies
or entirely avoids relevant political question doctrine precedent. The second
245. The Al-Aulaqi court queried how it could be that there more procedural safeguards
when the United States targets an individual overseas for surveillance than when an
individual is targeted for assassination. Id. at 8. The court appears content to leave this
question unanswered.
246. Id. at 47.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 48.
249. Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186 (1984).
250. Id. at 1191 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1984)).
251.

Id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976)).

252. The relevant framework for dealing with an issue of the right to life of an American
citizen is committed to the judicial branch in the form of the Fifth Amendment.
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major reason is that the application is inconsistent with the origin and
historical purpose of the political question doctrine.25 3 Regarding the first
reason, there are four ways in which the Al-Aulaqi decision incorrectly
applies judicial precedent regarding the political question doctrine.
First, the political question doctrine does not preclude judicial review of
extra-judicial assassination because there is a "specifically contemplated
judicial role in this area." 254 The Fifth Amendment's declaration that "[n]o
person shall be ... deprived of life ... without due process of law" is strong

evidence that the Founders intended that the judiciary should intervene
when a citizen is faced with execution. 255 Historically, the Due Process
Clause "has been applied to [any] deliberate decisions of government
officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property." 256 This is the very
purpose of the Due Process requirement-to require that the government
"follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to 'deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property.' 257 The Al-Aulaqi court abdicated this
essential judicial role in its decision. The court used the words "due
process" exactly ten times in an opinion that spanned sixty-four pages and
included near thirty-thousand words.2 58 Of these references, four are used to
simply list the allegations in Nasser's complaint. 259 Five of the references are
to procedural due process in the context of Nasser's standing, or lack
thereof, as a third party or next friend. 260 The one remaining reference
appears in a citation parenthetical. 2 6 1 Even though Nasser's allegations
contained specific reference to the rights guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause,262 the court did not find it necessary to discuss those rights. The due
process clause "serves to prevent governmental power from being used for
purposes of oppression," specifically by "barring certain government
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement

253. See supra Part III.A.
254. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
255. U.S. CONST. Am. V.
256. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (discussing the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
257. Id.
258. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1-64 (2010).
259. Id. at 12, 15.
260. Id. at 26-28.
261. Id. at 50.
262. Id. at 12 (citing Compl. 55 27-28, 30).
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them."263 The Clause is rendered defunct, however, when a court omits any
discussion of it. The Supreme Court has said that "history reflects the
traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause . .. 'was
intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers
of government. '"26 If this is true, then by ignoring the clause, the Al-Aulaqi
court neglected both tradition and common sense.
Second, like the decision of the Boumediene Court regarding detention,
when a person is sentenced to death by executive order, rather than by an
impartial magistrate, "the need for collateral review is most pressing. "265 The
Al-Aulaqi court noticed this concern, asking rhetorically whether the
executive could "order the assassination of a U.S. citizen without first
affording him any judicial process. "266 Since the beginning of the war on
terror, the Executive branch has insisted, at least implicitly, that it does
indeed have this power. "[No] statute ... can place any limits on the

President's determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military
force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the
response. These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President
alone to make." 267 "In the exercise of his plenary power to use military force,
the President's decisions are for him alone and are unreviewable."268 More
recently, the Department of Justice has published the criteria it uses to
determine whether a U.S. citizen is a "lawful" target. 269 The threat posed by
a U.S. citizen must be "imminent," capture must be "infeasible," and the
operation must abide by the "four fundamental principles" of the laws of
war governing the use of force. 270 There is no guarantee, however, besides
263. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,331-32 (1986).
264. Id. at 331 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)).
265. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008).
266. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d. at 9.
267. John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Atty. General, Memorandum: The President's
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations
Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm.
268. Id. at n.32 (emphasis added).
269. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS AN OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED
available at
Paper],
DOJ White
[Hereinafter
2013)
(Feb.
16
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJWhite-Paper.pdf.
270. Id. at 16. The DOJ criteria amount to an exercise in absurdity, due to the extent to
which the white paper redefines terms such as "imminent." The DOJ makes clear that
"imminent" does not mean "that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place
in the immediate future." Id. at 7. Indeed, what constitutes an "imminent threat" will
FORCE
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that which can be inferred from executive good faith, that these criteria will
be followed. The need for secrecy in combating the threat of terrorism can
scarcely be overstated. But necessity alone does not justify an unlawful
expansion of executive power. It is possible to find a middle ground
between these two interests. This has been demonstrated by the
determination of Congress, in other contexts, to ensure that the judicial role
in protecting liberty withstands seemingly inexorable executive war
power.27 ' In the case of extra-judicial assassinations, however, the DOJ has
clearly stated its opinion that "there exists no appropriate judicial forum to
evaluate these constitutional considerations."272 The need for collateral
review in such a situation is indeed most pressing.
Third, "claims alleging non-compliance with the law are justiciable,"
even though the review that the court undertakes may have an effect on
foreign affairs.273 Petitioner in Al-Aulaqi specifically alleged that the
administration's policies deprived him of his rights under the Fifth
Amendment, and that the administration was thereby in violation of the
law.274 The Al-Aulaqi court held that Nasser's claims "pose[d] precisely the
type of complex policy questions that [the court] has historically held nonjusticiable."275 The court claimed that resolving the questions posed by
Nasser would require the court to make detailed assessments regarding the
"develop to meet new circumstances and new threats." Id. The determination of
"imminence" must be made by a conveniently non-descript "informed, high-level official."
Id. at 8. The DOJ does recognize a need to abide by the four fundamental law of war
principles governing the use of force: necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity.
Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y General, Speech at Northwestern University School of Law (March 5,
2012) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech1203051.html). The administration equates this executive procedure with "due process,"
which it distinguishes from "judicial process." Id. The DOJ speaks in broad platitudes about
"our laws and our values," while subverting these same values, and replacing them with an
amorphous and indistinct "process" that it claims will adequately protect the constitutional
guarantee of due process. Id.
271. The FISA Courts were established by Congress to govern the process by which the
executive branch conducts surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence, even prescribing
criminal sanctions for violations of proper procedures. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802, 1809 (2010). A
discussion of the FISA Courts is beyond the scope of this Note, but their existence
demonstrates that alternate procedures exist to protect the secrecy of national intelligence
information, while providing a level of judicial due process.
272. DOJ White Paper, supra note 269, at 10.
273. DKT Mem'l Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Internal Dev., 810 F.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
274. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (2010).
275. Id. at 46.
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7
precise nature and extent of military intelligence and tactics. The court
has thus set up a false dilemma: either the executive's decision must stand
or the court must "elucidate the ... standards that are to guide a President
when he evaluates ... military intelligence."2 7 7 This false dichotomy neglects
the well-established principle that "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the [courts] to say what the law is.. . . [so] if a law be in opposition to the
constitution ... the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case." 7 ' Nasser has alleged a conflict between the "law" of the
executive and the law of the Constitution. 279 The court was not required to
"elucidate" a standard but to simply declare that the executive was not
acting in accordance with the Constitution. A court is not required to
promulgate a correct standard when declaring that an executive procedure
is unconstitutional. The court could have granted Nasser's injunction on
the grounds that the administration's policy was not in accord with due
process. As Marbury makes clear, upholding the Constitution, even against
the co-equal branches of government is "the very essence of judicial
duty." 280
Fourth, the Supreme Court has "reject[ed] the idea that when the United
2 81
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights."
The United States "can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution." 282 The restrictions of the Fifth Amendment
thus apply to American citizens no matter where they are located.
Surprisingly, given that the government was seeking to kill a U.S. citizen
who had never been charged with a crime, the Al-Aulaqi decision mentions
the Fifth Amendment only nine times. 283 Like its treatment of the Due
Process Clause, the court did not find a discussion of the Fifth Amendment

276. Id. The court noted four particular questions that would require resolution if the
court did not apply the political question doctrine: (1) the precise nature and extend of
Anwar's affiliation with AQAP; (2) whether the link between AQAP and Al-Qaeda was
sufficiently close as to bring AQAP into the current conflict between the U.S. and Al-Qaeda;
(3) the extent of the threat posed by Anwar; and (4) whether there was any available means
of addressing the threat short of lethal force. Id.
277. Id. at 47.
278. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,177-78 (1803).
279. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8. Nasser alleged that "the President [and others] have
unlawfully authorized the targeted killing." Id. (emphasis added).
280. Marbury,5 U.S. at 178.
281. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
282. Id. at 6.
283. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 1-64.
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necessary. The court's neglect of the Fifth Amendment is irreconcilable with
the principle that "when the Government reaches out to punish a citizen
who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped
away just because he happens to be in another land." 284 The court further
noted that "[t]his is not a novel concept. To the contrary, it is as old as
government." 28 5 If the administration had targeted an American citizen on
American soil, the public outcry would likely be deafening. There is no
qualitative difference between that scenario and the situation in Al-Aulaqi
because the Supreme Court has clearly held that the Bill of Rights is not
geographical in scope. 286 The political question doctrine cannot shield the
Al-Aulaqi court from its duty to analyze the administration's violation of
this clear precedent.
The second major reason why the political question doctrine was
incorrectly applied is that it was used in contravention of general principles
of law. To understand why this is the case, one must understand the
doctrine's origin. As discussed above,287 the origin of the political question
doctrine is found in Marbury v. Madison, which established that "[t]he
province of the court is ... not to enquire how the executive ... perform [s]

duties in which [he] ha[s] a discretion."" The long and storied political
question doctrine jurisprudence was founded upon this principle inherent
in the separation of powers.2 89 If the ellipses are removed from the
quotation from Marbury, however, we see the expression of the political
question doctrine contrasted with the paramount duty of the courts. "The
province of the court, is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive ... perform[s] duties in which [he] ha[s] a
discretion."2 90 The real issue, both in Anwar Al-Aulaqi's situation and in the
current debate over the use of extra-judicial assassinations, is which of these
two ideals will reign supreme-the discretion of the executive or the rights
of the individual? The Marbury Court provides us with the answer. "If [an
executive official] commits any illegal act, under color of his office, by
which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Reid, 354 U.S. at 6.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.A.
Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
Marbury,5 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added).
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alone exempts him from being ... compelled to obey the judgment of the
law."291 This Note argues that the assassination of an American citizen
without due process is unconstitutional. If that proposition is correct, there
is nothing that keeps the court from compelling the executive to obey the
rule of law, in spite of its claim of discretion. "[W]hat is there in the exalted
station of the officer, which shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of
justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the claim ... not
depending on executive discretion, but on ... the general principles of
law?"292 The Marbury decision recognizes that there is a law superior to the
executive, legislative, or judicial branches that they are each bound to obey,
upon which individual rights depend. These "general principles of law" are
inviolable and provide the basis of the rights established in the Declaration
of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness."293
Thus the question posed above is answered in favor of the latter choicethe rights of the individual are superior to the discretion of the executive.
These rights are fundamental to civil liberty; indeed, "[t]he very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection."2 94 The Al-Aulaqi decision
reversed this longstanding tradition, elevating the discretion of the
executive as superior to the rights of the individual. Where do we go from
here?
V. CONCLUSION

"Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national
conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its
dictates.... To be more safe, [the people], at length, become willing to run
the risk of being less free."295 This is the basic dilemma when balancing the
opposite sides of this issue. As noted previously, the realities of the war on
terror demand a certain degree of executive latitude. At the same time, the

291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).

Marbury,5 U.S. at 163.

295. THE FEDERALIST No. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
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amorphous nature of the enemy increases to a frightening extent the
potential for abuses of this latitude.296 It appears that the American people
are more inclined to elevate the need for safety over the need for
constitutional adherence. This is perhaps most evident in the deafening lack
of public outrage over the assassination of an American citizen without due
process. 297 The public seems blissfully unaware that the rationale that
applies overseas today will likely be applied at home tomorrow. The public
was more or less content to see a citizen terminated without due process,
without ever having been charged with a crime, simply because he was
located 15,000 miles from home. The remote nature of this constitutional
harm should not cause the issue to fade from public consciousness.
Americans must not be willing to accept geographical boundaries on the
rights enshrined in the Constitution.
Justice Scalia, commenting on Hamilton's quote in the Federalist No. 8,
remarked "The Founders warned us about the risk, and equipped us with a
Constitution designed to deal with it."298 It is up to the people to insist upon
adherence to the Constitution, even if the interests of public safety militate
against adherence. Safety from the threat of terrorism is worthless if we
obtain it by circumventing our best safeguard against tyranny. If we trade
the freedom that is truly valuable for safety that is transient, we act no more
wisely than the children of King Lear, and our venerable ancestors who
bequeathed us our Republic may well exclaim: "How sharper than a
serpent's tooth it is, to have a thankless child.""

296. The amorphous use of the word "terrorist" is an indication of how executive power,
especially the power inherent in possessing the ability to classify someone as a "terrorist,"
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